THE SOCIAL CLASSES AT LATEST LOOK
The storyline on the American status structure with which the marketing profession is most familiar was introduced into sociology by W. Lloyd Warner with the first volume of his Yankee City series (1941). Six social classes were identified in this work: upper-upper, lower-upper, uppermiddle, lower-middle, upper-lower, and lower-lower. This view of the status system crossed over into marketing in the 1950s, and has been forwarded almost intact ever since, although in recent years its currency has been questioned. The social classes that Warner "discovered" offered a new perspective on community life. His were not the economic classes, power clusters, or political interest groups postulated by other social scientists as the meaningful divisions of American society: they were as defined by Warnerclasses of people who were approximately equal in community esteem, and were made up of men and women who regularly socialized among themselves, in both formal and informal ways, and shared behavioral expectations. It was Warner's conviction that these classes represented the most basic ordering of Americans in terms of the self-feelings involved and of shared community respect. Researchers and marketers took note of this concept when Warner and his colleagues at the University of Chicago and Social Research, Inc. began demonstrating that members of different social classes displayed different purchase goals and shopping behaviors. The classes were thus motivational groupings as well as status categories-cause, thereby, not merely correlate, of consumption choice.
To ask how applicable this social class view is in the 1980s, given the decades that have passed since its initial formulation and subsequent adoption by the marketing profession, is, of course, a reasonable question. The critical issues are:
A thumbnail characterization of the class structure which Gilbert and Kahl offer as their new synthesis of political theory and sociological analysis appears in the left column of Exhibit A. In the right column, for comparison, is a similarly abbreviated characterization of the class structure set forth in Social Standing in America (Coleman and Rainwater 1978), which can be thought of as "the latest look" at social class taken from a Wamerian social-psychological perspective. This work is the product of a study sponsored in the 1970s by the Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard, in which a cross-section of 900 residents from the Boston and Kansas City metropolitan areas were interviewed intensively on status matters, focusing on their individual perceptions of the social hierarchy and felt participation in it.
What first strikes the eye in Exhibit A is how much these two "latest looks" at the status structure have in common. To a certain extent, however, this is deceiving, since the two views proceed on different classificatory principles. Gilbert and Kahl take a functionalist, "situations" stance, drawn in major part from economic as well as social-political theory. Coleman and Rainwater's view is reputational and behavioral, borrowing heavily from "man in the street" imagery. Nevertheless, there are two important similarities: they both acknowledge three principal groupings of Americans, and to each they assign almost identical portions of the population.
The roots for a threefold status division are very deep right now. This is the way the middle mass of citizens most readily talk about the hierarchy: there are "people (like us) in the middle," "people above," and 'people below," with economic status the major differentiating factor, followed by educational credentials and behavioral standards as secondary influences. And this is the way some of the wisest political analysts are looking at the electorate. In The Real American Majority, for example, Scammon and Wattenberg (1970) proposed that on social issues in people's ideas about crime and justice, morality and law the whitecollar middle class became allied with the blue-collar working class in the late 1960s to form a great American center wherein is found the "real majority" that swings elections. 1 What we see in these tripartite divisions of American society is truly a dramatic shift away from the bipartite view common to earlier interpretations. Before World War II, social scientists commonly pictured American society as split into opposing halves-a higher-half business class versus a lower-half working class, white-collars on the one side and blue on the other-or, put even more harshly, "have" superiors versus "have-not" inferiors. Now, in both models shown in Exhibit A, that split has diminished to a mere dividing factor within Middle America, while two formerly secondary division lines-one between Warner's upper-middle and lower-middle, the other between his upper-lower and lower-lower-have risen to primary status (leading, indeed, to class name changes).
The Gilbert-Kahl model is likely to prove of less interest in the long run to marketing people than is the Coleman-Rainwater model, but the rationales for its six ' The label "Middle Americans" for these people who form the political and social-philosophical center is commonly attributed to columnist Joseph Kraft, who began using it toward the end of 1967 in reference to that part of the public generally given to hardline anti-communism and conservative views on domestic social issues. In Kraft's initial usage and perception, Middle Americans tended to live more in the heartland than on the coasts, in small towns or in middle-income suburbia. In status, they tended to be either lower white-collar or upper blue-collar; it is this occupation image that sociologists have adopted in applying the phrase to the social status hierarchy.
subdivisions illustrate contemporary academic thinking about class in the United States. Gilbert and Kahl have organized their New Synthesis model around a "series of qualitative economic distinctions and their symbolization," and explain it this way:
1. The capitalist class, containing just 1 percent of the population, yet "controlling some 51-52 percent of the nation's wealth," is distinguished from the upper middle class most noticeably by its impressive ownership of income-producing assets.
2. The upper middle class is distinguished from the middle class by possession of sophisticated educational credentials which have given its members their entree to the valued managerial and professional posts they occupy.
3. The middle class is distinguished from the working class by a combination of job security and freedom from routinization at work; members of the class, wearing white or blue collars (but mostly the former), frequently "give orders to those below" in the workplace hierarchy, and they "usually feel secure" in their situations.
4. The working class is distinguished from the working poor by having escaped entrapment in the marginal sector of the labor market, and because their living standard tends to place them "in the mainstream" (albeit in "the lower half").
5. The working poor are distinguished from the underclass because, while not sure of steady employment, they are more often at work than not-and are not nearlv so severely limited in labor force participation.
6. The underclass is distinguished from all the other classes because in this class alone do people "receive a majority of their income either from illegal activities orfrom government transfers."
The Coleman-Rainwater approach to construction of a national status hierarchy is very different: it is designed to reflect popular imagery and observation of how people interact with one another-as equals, superiors, or inferiors. Personal and group prestige is at its heart. In this hierarchy, social standing is a multi-factored, richly textured phenomenon. Identification with each class is influenced most heavily by educational credentials and occupation (including income as a measure of work success), but it is also affected to varying degrees by social skills, status aspirations, community participation, family history, cultural level, recreational habits, and physical appearance; ultimately, the proper index to status is a person's social circle of accep-tance. No simple statements of qualitative distinction define each stratum with such theoretical precision as in the Gilbert-Kahl model. Nevertheless, three or four words can be used to communicate each stratum's thematic core-successively, from top down in Exhibit A, these might be "old family names," "accepted new money," "collegiate credentials expected," "white-collar associations," "bluecollar life style," "definitely below the mainstrearn," and "the welfare world." If these phrases remind readers of the conventional portraits of the status hierarchy, this is because the social ranking Americans apply to one another in reputation and interaction is demonstrating impressive thematic continuity from one generation and era to the next.
Applying the New Classification
What, then, should the marketing world do with these "latest looks" at social class? Drawing from my own research experience with the social class variable during the past two decades, I would suggest two ways this concept might be used in research and strategy planning. One is to divide the consuming public into four main status groupsUpper Americans, Middle Class, Working Class, and Lower Americans. The second suggestion is more a reminder than a new idea-namely, that it must always be kept in mind that a diversity of family situations and a nearly unbelievable range in income totals are contained within each class. The thumbnail sketches and three-word thematic summaries so commonly used to characterize status groups oversimplify in ways that cause people to forget the great variety of life circumstances found in every status group, whether it is the narrow world of upper-upper Upper Americans or the extremely large world of the working class. To illustrate: A "prototype" household of middle-class Middle American status has as its head a man employed in some lower management office job, earning between $24,000 and $29,999 a year (1983 urban-average dollars), whose wife isn't working, so that is all the family income. Almost as likely to be middle class is a divorcee with two years of college as an educational credential, who is trying to support two children on a legal secretary's salary of as little as $13,500-and who may be best friend and frequent bridge-playing chum to the wife in the first case. Another middle-class home will contain a working couple, both in office jobs, earning in combined total $42,000 or even $45,000 a year. A fourth might have as its head the owner of a bowling alley and restaurant whose wife may or may not be helping to run it-or the owner could be a Nvidow, divorcee, or never-married woman; in any case, the living standard projected by house, car(s), and clothes suggests an income of $60,000 or $70,000 a year, yet the social status is still middle class because, through lack of mobility aspirations and/or social skills, no Upper American connections and acceptance have been established.
A picture of equally great income and situational differences could be painted for every social level. When marketers and researchers use social class conceptually, they must remember the variations in age of household heads, the broken families, the single people, and the working couples found in each class, and must realize that all these people are trying to maintain similar social class identities and that in so doing, the motives and goals they bring to the marketplace may be functionally the same, although their means differ greatly.
A single class category of Upper Americans, formed by the bracketing together of upper-uppers with lower-uppers and upper-middles, is recommended on several counts. One is that in a representative sample there would be too few respondents from the two upper-class layers for separate study and statistical treatment unless the total survey size were to exceed 2,000 persons. A second is that diagnosis of social rank-as between these three levels-is not reliably accomplished via the kinds of class-measuring instruments used in the typical mass survey study; the data required for precise placement at these levels are not ordinarily collected, and machine scoring cannot easily be made sensitive to all the nuances involved.2 A third reason is that the motives and goals in consumption of most massmarketed products do not necessarily differ significantly between these three substrata of Upper Americans: only regarding luxury goods and services or specialty items are differences commonly critical.
The two social levels counted as Middle Americansmiddle class and working class-are most assuredly worth separate attention from the marketing profession, even though they may not be so sharply differentiated in public image or political views as they were a generation ago, when Warner named them lower-middle and upper-lower, respectively. That they still represent distinct social worlds with different behavioral norms and life styles, despite marked overlap in income, was one of the crucial findings in the Coleman-Rainwater research for Social Standing in America (1978). Educational background, class of origin, and a wife's social aspirations often override a husband's white-collar/blue-collar job definition in determining family identification with one class or the other. Consumption priorities and marketplace choices vary accordingly.
Lower Americans are separated into two subclasses in the Gilbert-Kahl as well as in the Coleman-Rainwater model. Both models thus reflect how, in the past 30 years, the public has come to differentiate between people who survive on government transfer payments and those who are poor but who do not usually depend on such assistance. In the 1970s, welfare workers and social scientists began 2Club memberships, specific colleges attended, religious affiliations, and ethnic identifications are all, on occasion, critical evidence of the exact step occupied on the Upper American social ladder-these are among "the nuances involved." Possibly one out of 15 or 20 families who rank upper-upper in social acceptance may not indeed be "oldmoney"; a portion of families never achieve upper-upper status even through three generations of wealth; and "nouveau riche" families are not always lower-upper-in a goodly share of instances, they fall somewhere below that, in a category best described as Non-Upper Rich. For further detail on the "nuances" of Upper American rank in metropolitan areas, see Coleman and Neugarten (1971) and Coleman and Rainwater (1978) . Still another kind of "nuance" is how to equate the high-status worlds of people living in smaller communities with those in metropolitan areas; this has not yet been solved to anyone's satisfaction. referring to the former as "the underclass," while applying "disadvantaged" to the class as a whole (Auletta 1982 The research the Chicago group blazed trails with in the very late 1940s showed upper-middle Americans pursuing different goals in home furnishing, appliances, clothing, food, and leisure time use than lower-middles, who in turn displayed consumption objectives (and aesthetic preferences) markedly different from upper-lowers. Certain "catch" phrases encapsulated these inter-class variations: upper-middles were identified with consumption choices reflecting "quality" and "taste," lower-middles with "respectability" and "conformity," upper-lowers with "modernity" and "quantity," and lower-lowers with "instant gratification." This became the accepted wisdom in marketing's theory and textbooks, holding sway through the 1960s.
During the 1970s, involvement with social class declined as alternatives emerged-most notably life styles, but also age cohorts, ethnic and racial subgroups, and even geographically related population breakdowns. One source for the distance marketers put between themselves and social class was the rise in the late 1960s of a counterculture that grew out of opposition to the Vietnam war, initially created divisions inside each class, and ultimately affected all classes, bringing new habits of grooming, sexual attitudes, language usage, and musical preference into the mainstream.
Another source for disaffection from class was the differentiation by age cohorts in public behavior that became so extreme in the late 1960s, and remained strong-though in modified ways-through the middle 1970s; generations appeared united across class lines in philosophy, marketplace priorities, and consumption choices. A third sourcein some ways a product of the other two-was an increasing visual confusion in the public signs of high status and low status. Life-style segmentation was, in its origin, part and parcel with class, which was the very rationale for its importance to marketers-as in Levy (1966; and Myers and Gutman (1974), who proclaimed life style "the essence of social class." In the last eight or 10 years, however, life style has become an independent concept, a catch-all of psychographic categories and recreational interest groupings that sometimes brings together people from several classes into one group and at other times divides a single class into subsegments. Some life-style, typologies are broad, signifying the basic thrust of a family's expenditure choices in time and money; others are narrow, referring to a single small piece of the total behavior by dividing Americans into runners, watersports enthusiasts, opera buffs, jazz fans. As such, life-style categories are of direct and obvious concern to merchandisers of products and services. Clearly, lifestyle research has a place in any proper sociology of consumption; ideally, though, life style should not replace social class, but exist in combination with it.
It is not surprising that social class sometimes seems 3The share of population percentages assigned to the status groups in this paper (see Exhibit A) should be treated as suggestive, not conclusive because these classes should be regarded as conceptual categories-not as precisely defined, measured-and-closed entities. The estimates for the Coleman-Rainwater model were reached after study of several community social-class samplings, contact with a few national cross-section panels, and examination of census data. The findings from these sources were pooled and filtered into a single "best guess" statement. These estimates of social class distribution vary from those printed in various textbooks and in early works on class because (1) the times have changed, (2) the class definitions have changed, and (3) these are projections to the nation rather than findings from one particular community.
Any estimates on income share by class are even more speculative. No documented study is available; the best that can be done is to project from sample data and census reports on distribution of each income level within the national total. Estimates the author would make on income share for This locational narrowness has been exhibited in such diverse matters as sports heroes, TV news interest, vacation patterns, and automotive choices. When working-class men are asked which sports figure they most eagerly follow in newspaper sports pages, three-fourths name a player on some local amateur or professional team, whereas less than half of middle-class men and a mere quarter of men from the Upper-American strata are so geographically confined in their preferences. When it comes to television news, much the same principle applies: working-class people like the local segments far more than do middle-class audiences, who show more enthusiasm for national and world coverage. Working-class vacation patterns also illustrate the point: staying in town is not uncommon, and "going away" quite frequently means to a lake or resort area no more than two hours distant; if the trip is a longer one, it's liktly that "relations" are the destination.
A 1976 study of car ownership by social status offers yet another perspective on working-class loyalties-in this instance to their own country, accompanied by great pride in its industrial accomplishments. By the mid-1970s, ownership of an imported car (whether an economy or a luxury model) had penetrated 40 percent of families in upper-status groups and 25 percent in the middle class, but had not reached even one-tenth in the working class. This was three years after the first gas price shock! Yet working-class car owners were still showing a marked preference for the standard sizes and larger cars, rejecting both domestic and foreign compacts; they were choosing used standards over any kind of new compact; and gas-guzzling pickups and recreational vehicles were still in great favor. Thus was the working class remaining the xenophobic heart of resistance to the foreign car invasion and dragging its heels in accepting the idea that America should reduce the size of its automotive equipment; the men of this class were not yet ready to give up this macho symbol of roadway conquest.
It is often speculated that the affluence which came to so much of blue-collar America in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s must surely have produced a change of attitudes and values; the phrase for this hypothesized change is "embourgeoisment." Yet research has usually demonstrated the contrary: the studies by Berger (1960) , Glen and Alston 4The research referred to in this and in the next two sections was almost invariably a team effort, involving the author and his associates at either Social Research, Inc., in Chicago or the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University. Nearly 200 different projects figure in this experience, featuring depth interviews with over 70,000 persons. For all practical purposes, these sample-survey respondents represent a cross-section of the American public-except for a bent toward residents of metropolitan areas rather than small towns and rural counties. The behaviors studied cover the gamut: television response, newspaper readership, attitudes toward cars, neighborhood preferences, cigarette choice, brand favoritism among beers, and sparetime usage, to name but a few. Findings not referenced to the bibliography have been drawn from research documents which remain the private property of clients who chartered the studies.
(1968), Hamilton (1972) , and LeMasters (1975) are examples. Their observations on the life styles of economically successful blue-collar workers hold that essentially no value change has occurred. For example, the traditional family structure marked by sharp sex-role division and stereotyping has been maintained: for women, the world continues to center on immediate kin, the extended clan, and perhaps a few longtime friends from neighborhood and growingup days; for men, a rich peer-group life is continuing at work and in such gathering places as the corner tavern or Moose Lodge, plus outings of masculine camaraderie (fishing trips, stock car races). Indeed, what sociologists and motivation researchers have been finding throughout the past 20 years is that working-class life styles have been almost impervious to change in their basic characteristics-i.e., the limited horizons, the centrality of family and clan, the chauvinistic devotion to nation and neighborhood have been little altered by the automobile, telephone, or television. The modernity-and change-that these people seek is in possessions, not in human relationships or "new ideas." For them, "keeping up with the times" focuses on the mechanical and recreational, and thus ease of labor and leisure is what they continue to pursue.
The men and women of Lower America are no exception to the rule that diversities and uniformities in values and consumption goals are to be found at each social level. Some members of this world, as has been publicized, are prone to every form of instant gratification known to humankind when the money is available. But others are dedicated to resisting worldly temptations as they struggle toward what some imagine will be a "heavenly reward" for their earthly sacrifices. One subdivision of Upper Americans that sociologists and demographers have singled out in recent years is a combination of media influentials (men and women with roles in TV, newspapers, and magazines) and nonprofit professionals (whose expertise is in the employ of government, schools, and foundations). Irving Kristol (1978) has referred to this group as "The New Class," differentiating them from older-type Upper Americans to the extent that they tend to be "anti-capitalists . . . (who) often take life and energy from an adversary culture whose anti-bourgeois themes infuse our educational system, our media, our arts, and our literature." Eric Goldman, speaking of approximately the same people in "The Emergence of the Upper Americans" (1980), characterizes them as "essentially a mind-set group" whose basic thrust in ideology and consumption style has been to establish themselves as different from, and above, the Middle American classes-as he puts it, they want to "shake off the tacky in everything." This Kristol-Goldman type of Upper American probably does not yet account for more than a fourth or a fifth of the total, but its growing presence has produced an indisputable change in the flavor of this status level from that of just two decades ago: liberalism is far more common in social philosophy; the Republican Party is much less firmly entrenched; and "socially conscious consumers" (Webster 1975 ) are a very noticeable presence.
Value Variations in Upper America
There are still large reservoirs of subscription to bourgeois values among Upper Americans, and clearly the class as a whole remains that segment of our society in which quality merchandise is most prized, special attention is paid to prestige brands, and the self-image ideal is "spending with good taste" (and being so judged). Self-expression is more prized than in previous generations, and neighborhood-always important-is still so, but with this twist: "interesting neighborhoods," such as gentrified inner-city areas, are appealing as well as the conventional suburbs, and living in a "charming place" in the country-in "exurbia" also has cachet (Coleman 1977b ). Meanwhile, all the longstanding Upper American dreams of more theatre going when income increases, more purchase of books, investment in art, and more European travel endure (and possibly in greater strength), along with aspiration for 'more help in the house," more "'nights out on the town," more club memberships for golf, swimming, and tennis, and prestige schooling for the children. For most Upper Americans, income is not sufficient to afford all these dreams simultaneously, so priorities are a must-only a lucky few don't have to make sacrifices and choices.
The Middle Class: More Pleasure Mixed into the Propriety
This status level ("lower-middle," to stick with Warner's terminology) has been recognized from the beginning as the home of people who most definitely want to "do the right thing" and buy "what's popular." They have been very concemed with fashion all along, following-with affordable modifications-the recommendations of "experts" in the print media. When families of this class have increased their earnings to manage it, better living has meant-and still seems to mean-a "nicer home" in a "nicer neighborhood," "on the better side of town," with "good schools." It also means spending more money on "worthwhile experiences" for the children, and aiming them toward a college education; shopping at more expensive stores for clothing with "one of the better brand names"; and constant concern over the appearance of public areas in one's home-i.e., wherever guests may visit and pass judgment.
Interviews in the 1970s with men and women of this class suggest that a spirit of "individualism" has been entering into their life styles far more than before. This has happened in part because "doing your own thing" was that decade's fashion, and in part because emulating the selfexpressiveness of Upper Americans, in qualified ways, became a conscious goal. This upward gaze of middle-class people continues to distinguish them from the working class; they are among the big supporters of dinner theater and all the other cultural trickle-down from Upper America. The ongoing middle-class struggle to uplift oneself has led significant numbers to enroll sporadically at local universities and community colleges. Imaged as a mental challenge and storehouse for knowledge, the home computer will do particularly well here when it reaches mass-market pricing.
There is not so much "stuffiness" in middle-class selfpresentation these days as there was in the 1950s. Public dress codes have relaxed, and these people have taken their cue from Upper Americans. They eat out more, talk more comfortably about having cocktails, and enjoy trips to Las Vegas (if it's no more than a two-or three-hour flight away). "Doing things for the children" commonly includes enjoyment for the parents too, as in winter ski trips for the whole family in which the children acquire a socially valued skill and the parents maintain one. Indeed, such themes as physical activity form a new image of middle-class life in which possessions-pride has yielded a bit to activities-pleasure. Life seems more fun, not quite so serious at this status level in the 1980s. Deferred gratification may still be an ideal, but it is not so often practiced; selfdenial and self-indulgence are in closer balance.
As in the world of Upper America, so too in the Middle American middle class, varieties of life style are found. Some reflect a split within the class between traditional outlooks and the more liberated, contemporary view; others are related to which kinds of possessions are most treasured, which pleasures most eagerly pursued.
CLASS VS. INCOME
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of studies reported conflicting conclusions as to whether social class or income better predicts buyer behavior. The end result was that the role assigned to social class by marketing professionals went into decline. Little further attention was paid to social class versus income until 1981, when two noteworthy reexaminations of the question were published almost simultaneously by Schaninger (1981) and Dominquez and Page (1981). These two articles constitute so thorough and thoughtful a review of the several technical and substantive issues involved that yet another examination here would serve no useful purpose.5 Among the conclusions reached by Dominquez and Page were (1) that "new stratification scales" should be developed to accord with the new status realities of the 1980s, and (2) that future research should look closely into how the value and communication systems associated with each class underlie consumption patterns. Schaninger proposed the "tentative generalizations" that: Schaninger thus pronounced himself in agreement with Wind (1978), whose contention was that the entire controversy as to whether income or social class is the more basic segmentation variable is spurious, since it is better to accept both as valuable, then determine product by product what contribution each makes. Reynolds (1965) took the same view when he argued that the forecasting powers of class and income should be expected to differ from one market arena to the next, so that neither should be ignored or assigned automatic dominance.
There are many reasons for considering both class and income when trying to understand the consumer, but the truly critical one is this: class and income are not really very well correlated. They index two quite different aspects of life circumstance, although it is common for Americans to assume that class is really a product of income. Had Warner (1941) It must not be forgotten that social status derives, in its root, more from occupational differentiation than from income. This is an ancient observation, dating to pre-Christian societies. There has never been a perfect correlation between the social honor paid different occupations and the income derived from their pursuit. Twentieth century America may illustrate this proposition to an extreme degree: blue-collar workers can outearn both white-collar workers and salaried professionals, yet they still do not rise above either in social status. To put this in the vernacular, the blue-collar workers "have more money than class," the white-collar workers "more class than money."
A second explanation for the unextraordinary correlation between class and income is that income varies markedly according to its earner's location in the age cycle. Young people-who are first apprentices, then in the junior stages of their careers-typically receive paychecks far below average for members of the social class with which they are identified by virtue of family origin, education, and occupational type. Class "norms" in earning power-i.e., what is publicly assumed to be average earnings for members of the class-are typically realized after age 35. Beyond 55, earnings tend to either exceed the norm or fall below it, depending on whether the benefits of seniority or the hazards of ill health and/or occupational obsolescence prevail.
A third source of income overlap between the social classes is family variation in the number and sex of earners. This can almost certainly be considered a major factor in how much reduction has occurred in the class-income correlation over the last 20 years. As more families at all social levels have experienced divorce, leading to households headed by a female earner, household incomes far below class averages have been added to the picture in larger portions. Meanwhile, as more wives have become part-or full-time members of the nation's paid workforce, household incomes far above the class average have also been added to each status group's continuum in far greater proportions than before. The result of these and other changes-such as more households in all classes headed by young singles, retirees, and the elderly widowed-is that the picture of income distribution in each class resembles an elongated oblong more than a compact, bell-shaped curve.
Clarification of Income and Class
In considering family variation in number and sex of earners as a contributor to the reduced class-income correlation, two points must be kept in mind:
1. Total household income is an illusory index to family living standards-much less to social class-wherever it includes money earned by household members that is not pooled toward the common good.
2. Increases in family income resulting from more of the individual members becoming earners almost never produce a change in the family's social class.
What, then, is the best income figure-household total, individual earnings, or some factored partial product-for use in predicting the marketplace behavior of the individual members (and combinations thereof) in a multi-income household? An inquiry into this problem, using detailed data from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's Panel Study of Income Dynamics, produced more questions than answers (Coleman 1977a ). For example, it was found that when young adults work full time and live at home, their contribution to parental well-being ranges from 10? on the dollar to 50 or 60?. Wives' earnings contribute more than children's to the household's public projection of well-being, but vary markedly in whether the money goes toward life-style extras or living-standard basics. Clearly, the most widely used measure-total income earned by all a household's members, as reported by the survey respondent (inaccuracies in which abound!)-has its drawbacks; when income has turned out to be a poor predictor of consumer choice behavior, this definitional approach may well have been part of the fault.
Also, why does an increase in household income rarely result in class change when members of a family beyond its head join the workforce? A major reason is that these other earners usually work at jobs of no higher status than the primary earner's; more commonly, their jobs are of less stature. This applies especially when adult children go to work; usually, it also applies when a wife finds employment. Take a lower-class, trash-collecting husband, for example: when his wife enters the labor force, she is apt to become some sort of cleanup helper. Although the couple's income is thereby increased, community judgments of its social class are likely to remain the same, especially if no change is made in friendship circles and the major observable alteration in living standard is ownership of more "junk" cars and consumption of more beer. By the same token, when the wife of a factory worker husband goes to work in a factory too, the couple's total income may rise far beyond the middle-class average, but the pair will remain working class in social identity because middle-class America does not readily accept women with blue-collar employment-and such a woman probably isn't even trying for it.
The truth is that the classes we are talking about have mostly to do with social networks and peer judgments of "people quality," and have little to do with income levels 6In the mid-1950s study of Kansas City by the University of Chicago's Committee on Human Development, a 0.55 correlation between social class and income was produced in a sample limited to households with heads in the middle-age range of 40-69 years (Coleman and Neugarten 1971) . With households of all types drawn from the total age range, the correlation would not have been higher than 0.45, which leads to the assumption that today's is even lower. Studies where social class is indexed by a relatively uncomplicated socio-economic status scale may show higher correlations with income, but depth studies of class versus income will consistently report lower ones. except as these latter can be construed as proof of that quality. Thus it is that social class changes ordinarily come to a family only when the major earner-who may well be a woman-manages a shift in the public's definition of relationship to the occupational hierarchy. This change in occupational definition is accompanied by a change in friendship circles, and new consumption goals replace the old; hence the family value system and its public behavior are deemed appropriate for acceptance by a higher status circle.
That changes in economic status do not more often lead to changes in social class is yet one more explanation for the very modest class-income correlation. The sum impact of all these contemporary sources for difference between income status and social class is a lower correlation between the two than was the case in the 1950s, when social scientists first called the marketing world's attention to the class concept. As an allied development we have this: substantially greater percentages of each class's families are either "overprivileged" or "underprivileged"-and thus not "average" -than was the case two decades ago, when this way of parceling off the income continuum was first proposed (Coleman 1960 ). All these changes mean that it is still useful to look at social classes as divided into three economic subclasses-perhaps even more so.
The definitions offered for these economic substrata are as before. These figures are of course no more than approximations, the loosest of guidelines for looking at the significance of income in a social class context. They relate to urban areas where the cost of living is presently at average for the nation, and most properly only to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' hypothetical four-person family (father 43 years of age, mother 38, and two children, ages 13 and 8). For families of other situation and size, appropriately varied standards should be applied when examining buyer behavior for impact of income status within class. Indeed, this is more a conceptual tool than a tidy research device.
Research Support
The continuing vitality of this income-in-class concept has been affirmed during the last 10 years by a series of depth studies of life-style and consumption choices in which special emphasis has been given to families of above-average income. Observe, for illustration, how different is the marketplace behavior among Upper American families with annual incomes of $30,000 to $75,000 (in 1983 dollars) from that of families with the same income who would be judged to be Middle Americans (either middle class or working class). The former are, of course, either "classaverage" or "underprivileged" within their Upper American status world, while the latter are "overprivileged" in Middle America. The "overprivileged" Middle Americans can be distinguished from the "underprivileged" Upper Americans by the much greater frequency with which they own motorboats, RVs, campers, pickup trucks for sport as well as work, tractor lawnmowers, snowblowers, remote control TV, swimming pools in the backyard and/or a lakeside home, late-model sports cars for their teen-aged collegiate offspring, and expensive, largish cars for themselves. Upper Americans of the same income spend relatively greater amounts-of both time and money-on private club memberships, special educational experiences for their children, high-culture objects and events, and civic affairs participation ("causes," boards, and so on); their houses are not particularly more expensive than Middle Americans's but are much more "properly" addressed, and their cars are not so often domestic and pretentious as small and/or foreign. Equally noteworthy differences in consumption choices appear up and down the scale when people of the same income but of different social class are compared.
This illustration of how class and income are continuing to interact points to a resolution for the class-income debate. The question of whether class or income is the better segmentation variable should be put aside. What researchers should ask instead is how social class affects use of income in the marketplace-and also when, why, and to what extent.
Income is the obvious first-order segmenting variable whenever expenditure decisions are studied; income and outflow both involve dollars, so a correlation of sorts is inevitable. It makes perfect sense to assume that in a major number of marketplace transactions, income will govern how much can be spent (and hence will be). Yet we always have to use other variables-age, perhaps, or sex, family composition, life style, self-image, and social class-to understand why income has sometimes operated quite well as a predictor and other times rather poorly. As often as not, the reason will be found in social class, which may be acting all by itself or possibly in concert with one or more other social-psychological or demographic variables.
Researchers can expect to find every conceivable mix of class impact on income use, from almost nil in some product or service areas to nearly conclusive in others. An instance of the latter might be spending money to watch stock car races: very few people outside the working class or lower class are interested, so this is almost entirely a matter of class-related entertainment preferences, rather than cost considerations. The purchase of squash racquets is equally a matter of class experience, and only coincidentally an income consideration, since very few men outside Upper America play squash. Extremes like this are not, however, the rule.
Far more common are market areas in which the effect of class follows the privilege-level model. The car market used to be an example (see Coleman 1960), with choice behavior best explained when each class was broken down into its "privilege" segments. By the early 1970s, however, the whole business of car buying had become so heavily infused with life-style goals and self-imagery expressions that income position within social class was not a ready predictor. By that point in auto market history, class was having its maximum impact (income almost totally aside) in determining who was most likely to buy foreign and who domestic, or who would opt for intermediates (and/or compacts) versus who would stick with standards.
It is still necessary to look at social class and income simultaneously when trying to understand how people house themselves and where they choose to do so in a metropolitan area. Class identification and status aspirations govern neighborhood choice (Coleman 1977b ), then pocketbook power dictates which house or apartment. This has not changed through the years. Yet Schaninger (1981) has suggested change in the income-class relationships in kitchen appliance choice. Indeed, change may be more the rule than constancy; nothing can be taken for granted.
Finally, there are product areas in which the impact of social class is at best unclear and slight, although probably not absent entirely. Examples might be cigarettes and perhaps beer. Among cigarette smokers and beer drinkers, there is usually a heavy investment in feelings of maturity and toughness, perhaps a bit of rebellion against prudish morality, a willingness (even eagerness) to identify with all of "sinning" humanity. Social status statements are not so commonly the goal as are psycho-sexual ones. Brand choices may still correlate with class, but at a low level, so they are hardly predictable.
Too much may have been expected of social class by too many, so that disappointment has been the result. Were class treated as proposed here, this should not happen. One more problem is that all class measuring sticks do a poor job of indexing the status of households that fall outside the marital-couple mold (i.e., male head in the middle of his career with wife who is a homemaker/ mother). This flaw becomes more serious with the yearly rise in two-income families, female-headed households, independent young singles, retired people, and so on, all of whom are easily misidentified for social class when different score criteria are not applied to their particular circumstances.
PROPOSITIONS FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF CLASS
In the earliest studies of social class, status identification was determined by extensive interviewing in a community about reputations of individuals and groups; this was coupled with elaborate charting of formal and informal interaction patterns, and the combination of these procedures was labeled Evaluated Participation (Warner et al. 1949b ). Such an approach is possible only in small communities and with virtually unlimited funds. Yet its end productpersonal placement according to identification with ranked status networks-is the goal researchers seek when looking at the impact social class has on choice behaviors in the consumption arena. This is what must be aimed for in less time-consuming, less expensive ways.
In an "ideal world" (just one step down in methodological complexity from Evaluated Participation), survey respondents would be interviewed for about 90 minutes, with all manner of socio-economic facts elicited-i.e., a full accounting of present life style, plus biographical data back to childhood. The interviewer would then attach two or three pages of detailed observation on the respondent's speech, appearance, and manner (and likewise for the spouse and other family members), household furnishings and upkeep, the home's exterior appearance, and characteristics of the neighborhood. This kind of data base would provide the researcher with almost as much evidence for placement of sample members as Americans at large use in their daily lives when they rate one another and decide whom to consider status equals, inferiors, and superiors. In a real world of limited budgets, researchers must settle for less, of course: how much less-and what kind of "less" -will vary depending on their funds and objectives.
It would also be ideal if the social class placements for a researched population could be rendered by an "expert," a sensitive interpreter of the data who would subjectively analyze how all the bits and pieces of fact and impression about a given individual go together to produce a ranking in the status hierarchy. But there are only a few such experts around, so less talented placers or mechanized devices must suffice in almost all research situations. Whether some level of human skill must be brought to bear or whether a machine-graded scale is sufficient depends on whether social class is at center focus in the research or merely one of many variables contemplated.
I would now like to offer four propositions about what combinations (and kinds) of skill and scale should be called on by researchers in different circumstances, with this caveat: these propositions are guidelines, not final solutions. They are first steps, as it were, toward updated, improved techniques in the research indexing of the social class variable.
Proposition 1: For the consumer researcher who is seeking nothing more than suggestive evidence of class's impact in a product area, it is recommended that a simplified, proxy measure be accepted.
An example of such a measure, the Computerized Status Index (CSI), is presented in Exhibit B, which shows the latest version in a series of such computerized indexes originally developed for Social Research, Inc. in the late 1960s. Researchers are encouraged to treat this version as illustrative and to experiment with similar measuring sticks more appropriate for the field approach they employ and data they will generate.
Exhibit B is the page in an interview protocol given over to field collection of data, ratings, and coding for a CSI. In this particular version, occupation is weighted double when computing the total score; other versions include an occupation scaling specifically for employed women, to be used whether they are the spouse or the household head, and a somewhat different weighting scheme. When a respondent is not married, education is given a double weight along with occupation. Variations in score interpretation sometimes must be employed if, for instance, income levels where the study is conducted are markedly below or above the national average, or if the interviewers appear to have been unusually generous in their ratings of occupation and/or neighborhood status. When sensitivity by age, marital status, and household situation is introduced into the score-interpretation programming, the minimum totals required for any given social class assignment are dropped by one, two, or three 7 points, depending on the circumstances. Proposition 2. When the research objective is an in-depth study of the relationship between social class and consumption choice, assignment of sample cases to class groupings should be rendered in qualitative fashion by "expert" judgment.
This should be the case whether the data available for the judgment cover only three or four variables or extend to an extensive battery of 20 or 30 class-related behavioral and demographic factors. Such qualitative and "expert" judgment is required for proper balancing of the variables and weighing of their differential status impact, depending on the ages involved, the household composition, and locale. This in-depth approach to classification is recommended to all research institutes and advertising agencies that have established consumer panels for regular collection of consumption data and intensive analysis of marketplace choice correlates. These scales should be constructed so that, when combined in a multi-factored index, they produce a visual profile of status assets and liabilities in each case under study; to do this, scores on each variable should relate to social class in the same way. How this principle works is exemplified by the eight scales that form the Index of Urban 7Total scores on the illustrated Computerized Status Index (CSI) produce a "correct" social class placement for at least 75 percent of cases in a sampled population, when no special coding or score interpretation is applied for households at the age extremes or to unmarried respondents. When instructions for these special circumstances are programmed in, the class identification accuracy rises toward 90 percent.
The reader may ask, with complete justification: "What is the standard of proof for a 'correct' status placement?" The answer is this: if all data on a person's social network were available, and intensive community study had placed that network in the status hierarchy-and if, in addition, extensive reputational data had been assembled on the person to be classified-a "correct" status call could be made by the research team involved. Such occurred in the early days of class research, but it will never happen again. Anything we can today call a "correct placement" is one based on 30 or 40 pieces of evidence, rather than only three, four, or five. The basis for the assertion above that the CSI gives a "correct placement" just 75 (or maybe 80) percent of the time is comparisons made between placements rendered by a three-or four-factor CSI and those rendered by an "expert" using 10 times that many strands of status-relevant data on the same cases. Again, the reader must be cautioned: social class is a conceptual tool and, lacking precise definition, is ultimately not susceptible to perfect measurement, nor to absolute standards of validity in case placements.
EXHIBIT B EXAMPILE OF A COMPUTERIZED STATUS INDEX (CSI)
Interviewer circles code numbers (for the computer) which in his/her judgment best fit the respondent and family. Interviewer asks for detail on occupation, then makes rating. Interviewer often asks the respondent to describe neighborhood in own words. Interviewer asks respondent to specify income-a card is presented the respondent showing the eight brackets-and records R's response. If interviewer feels this is over-statement or under, a "better-judgment" estimate should be given, along with explanation. What is needed in light of "the husband only fallacy"? For one, the neighborhood variable should be included as often as possible in status-measuring devices. Neighborhood is almost always a measure-albeit indirect-of a woman's social horizons and aspirations. A scale for female educational background is even more necessary, and should be weighted as heavily in any family total score as the male scale for schooling. Ideally, it should measure the "which school" factor of collegiate education, what personal associations were formed while there (such as membership in a sorority), and number of years completed, since these associational factors have historically been the most socially consequential part of a woman's post-high-school educational credentials (Coleman and Neugarten 1971; Coleman 1973) . A scale for women's occupations, as distinguished from men's, is also recommended because different principles of status consequence have applied in the past-and probably still do. Whatever the job, the work setting (factory vs. office or school, high-status retail store vs. low) and the clientele served can be critical indicators of a woman's class identification. Introducing scales such as these into status-measuring instruments would greatly increase their relevance for households headed by women; it would also improve their predictive accuracy for marital couples, especially those at the age extremes.
EDUCATION

CONCLUSION
The four propositions just described are offered in the hope they will lead to the regeneration of social class as a research variable. They are a start only, and do not begin to solve new problems that will emerge.8 There is much to be done if social class is to be reinvigorated as a variable in the analysis of marketplace behavior. Class placement of research samples should be attempted as often as possible, employing modernized status measuring sticks. How Americans of each status level vary from one another in self-concept, values, and consumption goals must be examined repeatedly, and the findings must be applied to specific product and service areas.
As we survey the past 30 years, what is perhaps most astonishing is how much continuity there has been in class value systems, which have remained relatively intact through economic cycles of inflation and recession and through pronounced changes in apparel customs, car purchases, and food habits. The many life-style variations that have appeared within each class-and that have crossed class lines to unite members of different status groups in common spare-time pursuits-have tended to obscure the fundamental continuity of the class structure; so too have changing educational standards and occupational shifts in income reward, not to mention declining family stability.
The social class concept is not so much 'outdated as it is underutilized. Sophisticated application has not been easy, and never will be. Marketers, however, must not let this difficulty turn them away from keeping constant track of how (and whether) social class is continuing to be significant-as shaper of consumer goals, as influence on marketplace choice.
[Received August 1982. Revised August 1983.] 8One problem not touched upon here is the class identification of farm families and the measurement thereof. The relationship of rural Americans and residents of the smaller country towns to the urban status structure has remained unexamined since World War 11 as Americans have flocked to the metropolitan areas and their burgeoning suburbs. If, as witnessed in the 1970s, our population continues its contrary move away from metropolis and out to exurbia, small towns, and smaller cities, this nonmetropolitan sector will become more important in the future. In any event, we should extend our social class investigations and concepts to include those millions of Americans who live outside the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs).
